Divine Satisficing and the Ethics of the Problem of Evil

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Theology and Philosophy of Evil Philosophical Ethics and Theory Karl Barth and Christian Theology

Abstract

This paper accomplishes three goals. First, it reveals that God’s ethics has a radical satisficing structure: God can choose a good enough suboptimal option even if there is a best option and no countervailing considerations. Second, it resolves the long-standing worry that there is no account of the good enough that is both principled and demanding enough to be good enough. Third, it vindicates the key ethical assumption in the problem of evil without relying on the contested assumption that God’s ethics is our ethics (on steroids).

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References

2000Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God 2002The Possibility of Parity 2002Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics 2010UNTYING A KNOT FROM THE INSIDE OUT: REFLECTIONS ON THE “PARADOX” OF SUPEREROGATION 2017God's Own Ethics: Norms of divine agency and the argument from evil 2016The Distinction between Justifying and Requiring: Nothing to Fear 2015Satisficing and Motivated Submaximization (in the Philosophy of Religion)2016How to think about satisficing

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