Intellectual Responsibility and the Scope of the Will

Abstract

If we can be criticized for our beliefs as well as for our actions, it might seem that beliefs are like actions in being under voluntary control. This seems especially plausible where we have both strong evidence for a proposition we consider and equally strong evidence for its negation. In some cases like this, might one, “at will,” believe or withhold the proposition? Might these exhibit what has been called “epistemic agency”? This chapter explores what constitutes doing something at will and whether believing and withholding are ever directly voluntary or even actions at all. The chapter argues that denying that they are actions—acts of intellect, presumably—does not imply that we lack intellectual responsibility for them. In accounting for intellectual responsibility, the chapter distinguishes several forms of doxastic self-control. Doxastic responsibility includes both the kind of control we have over our beliefs and the kind we have over our basis for holding them, say for a good reason rather than from prejudice. The chapter distinguishes three kinds of responsibility for believing and withholding, indicates some ways such responsibilities may be fulfilled, and describes several dimensions of intellectual responsibility and some standards for living up to it.

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