How a critical Humean naturalism is possible: Contesting the Neo-Aristotelian reading

Abstract

Ethical naturalists such as Philippa Foot, John McDowell or Sabina Lovibond have critically distinguished their version of naturalism from the version ascribed to David Hume. This article defends Hume’s naturalism against this criticism in constructing a more plausible version of it. The article briefly delineates John McDowell’s reading of Hume in his well-known ‘Two Sorts of Naturalism’. Based on Nietzsche, the article then offers the concept of ‘historical naturalism’ as alternative to McDowell’s reading, concentrating in particular on the charge of Hume’s naturalism being narrowly empiricistic. The concept of historical naturalism will be contrasted with David Wiggins’ Humean variant of vindicatory naturalism. In conclusion, Annette Baier’s suggestion of reconstructing Hume’s naturalism as critical is taken up and elaborated upon. While the spirit of Baier’s approach is adopted, its application to the problem of deeply entrenched sexism will be treated as overly optimistic.

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