Belief In Psyontology

Jonathan Weisberg

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophy and Theoretical Science Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs

Abstract

Neither full belief nor partial belief is more fundamental, ontologically speaking. A survey of some relevant cognitive psychology supports a dualist ontology instead. Beliefs come in two kinds, categorical and graded, neither more fundamental than the other. In particular,\nthe graded kind is no more fundamental. When we discuss belief in on/off terms, we are not speaking coarsely or informally about states that are ultimately credal.\n

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