PROVIDING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: ELECTORAL DELEGATION AND COOPERATION

Martin G. Kocher · Jing Yu

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Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Game Theory and Voting Systems Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

Abstract

Abstract This study experimentally examines the effect of electoral delegation on providing global public goods shared by several groups. Each group elects one delegate who can freely decide on each group member's contribution to the global public goods. Our results show that people mostly vote for delegates who assign equal contributions for every group member. However, in contrast to standard theoretical predictions for our delegation mechanism, unequal contributions across groups drive cooperation down over time, and it decreases efficiency by almost 50% compared to the selfish benchmark. This pattern is not driven by delegates trying to exploit their fellow group members, as indicated by theory. It is driven by conditional cooperation of delegates across groups. Since one of the potential sources of the resulting inefficiency is the polycentric nature of global public goods provision together with other‐regarding preferences, we use the termP‐inefficiencyto describe our finding. (JELC92, D72, H41)

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1999A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation 2007z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments 2010Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems 19952. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research 2001Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment 2015Subject pool recruitment procedures: organizing experiments with ORSEE 2009Group Identity and Social Preferences 2010Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature

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2019Delegation and Public Pressure in a Threshold Public Goods Game

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