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In the 1970s, a sense of crisis emerged among experimental social psychologists about the relevance and utility of the kind of knowledge being produced in their laboratories, and whether the sorts of things that were worthy of study could be examined fruitfully in such a fashion. This chapter explores four propositions. The first is that the classical experiments were more like demonstrations or dramatizations of important social questions, not strict tests of hypotheses. The second is that many of the classical experiments borrow from common sense knowledge of social structures to make the laboratory treatments intelligible, morally relevant and seductive. Third, the experiments in social psychology are often motivated to demonstrate a condition that cannot be resolved by reference to facts and whose conceptual appeal is more subjective than objective. Many classic studies raise fundamental questions about human nature that are more the province of philosophy or divinity than empirical science. Fourth, this juxtaposition between the formal rationale of experiments and their actual achievements raises intense self-doubts in the discipline about its achievements. The matter is further exacerbated by the widespread use of deception of participants and the tension between the scientific and common sense foundations of knowledge.
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