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Akratic (epistemic) modesty
16 references·1 citing·36 second hop
Akratic (epistemic) modesty (2020)Akratic (epistemic) modestyThe Epistemic Role of Consciousness (2019)The Epistemic Role of Conscio…Rationality’s Fixed Point (or: In Defense of Right Reason) (2015)Rationality’s Fixed Point (or…Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat (2014)Higher‐Order Evidence and the…Belief, credence, and norms (2013)Belief, credence, and normsMoore’s Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification (2011)Moore’s Paradox and the Acces…Peer Disagreement and Higher‐Order Evidence (2010)Peer Disagreement and Higher‐…Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy (2009)Disagreement as Evidence: The…Reflection and Disagreement (2007)Reflection and DisagreementThe Epistemic Significance of Disagreement (2005)The Epistemic Significance of…DEFEATERS AND HIGHER-LEVEL REQUIREMENTS (2005)DEFEATERS AND HIGHER-LEVEL RE…Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification (2002)Evidence, Pragmatics, and Jus…Belief's Own Ethics (2002)Belief's Own EthicsExperts: Which Ones Should You Trust? (2001)Experts: Which Ones Should Yo…The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality (2000)The Lottery Paradox, Knowledg…On Acting Rationally against One's Best Judgment (2000)On Acting Rationally against …THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY (1993)THE NATURE OF RATIONALITYDeference Done Better (2021)Deference Done BetterWhat is Justified Belief? (1979)Epistemology and Cognition (1987)Knowledge and Lotteries (2003)Normative Externalism (2019)Reasons First (2021)The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments (1953)Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons (1999)On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology (2007)Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications (2014)Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News (2007)YOU JUST BELIEVE THAT BECAUSE…1 (2010)Why Suspend Judging? (2015)The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1963)The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1963)The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2013)Fake News and Partisan Epistemology (2017)Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts (1986)Content Preservation (1993)Knowledge in a Social World (1999)Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy (2006)Rationality: a social-epistemology perspective (2014)Knowledge and its Limits (2002)The Philosophy of Philosophy (2007)The Importance of Being Rational (2018)Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge (1976)Affective Experience, Desire, and Reasons for Action (2019)Confidence in consciousness research (2022)Kant's Reason (2023)Individual differences in rational thought. (1998)Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate? (2000)Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making (2004)Higher‐Order Evidence 1 (2010)Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief (2012)Why we don’t deserve credit for everything we know (2006)Norms of Assertion (2007)Justification and the Truth-Connection (2012)
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References

  • 1993THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY1,040 cited
  • 2001Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?910 cited
  • 2002Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification786 cited
  • 2007Reflection and Disagreement660 cited
  • 2005The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement597 cited
  • 2010Peer Disagreement and Higher‐Order Evidence580 cited
  • 2002Belief's Own Ethics538 cited
  • 2014Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat467 cited
  • 2009Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy431 cited
  • 2019The Epistemic Role of Consciousness424 cited
  • 2013Belief, credence, and norms384 cited
  • 2000The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality327 cited
  • 2015Rationality’s Fixed Point (or: In Defense of Right Reason)303 cited
  • 2000On Acting Rationally against One's Best Judgment292 cited
  • 2011Moore’s Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification275 cited
  • 2005DEFEATERS AND HIGHER-LEVEL REQUIREMENTS256 cited

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  • 2021

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Deference Done Better
26 cited