Governance without government: polyarchy in nineteenth-century European international politics

Abstract

In his now classic analysis of international politics, Kenneth Waltz argues that communities and systems of states are organized around one of two fundamental principles: hierarchy and anarchy. These are ideal types, and he would probably allow that systems may combine elements of both. Yet, for a parsimonious theory of international politics, it is necessary to start with simplifying assumptions and from them to infer important qualities of the relationship between actors. Hierarchies are characterized by divisions of labor, specialization, and authority structures. Within states, for example, governments possess legitimate authority and maintain a monopoly of power to compel obedience. Anarchies have the opposite characteristics: there is no authority to command, the units copy each other's multiple tasks (there is no division of labor), and there is no presumption of obedience. States must therefore bargain with each other to defend and achieve their objectives and purposes. War is the ultimate arbiter of conflicts of interest, and, in the final analysis, self-help is the only reliable strategy for survival. In anarchy, there is no governance. Outcomes of conflicts are determined by the relative power positions of the actors rather than by the application of law or some other regulatory device by a legitimate authority. Change in international relationships is achieved either by persuasion, coercive threats, or armed force. There are no institutional or procedural counterparts of the executive, legislative, or judicial functions within a hierarchical system.

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