A Defense of Privacy as Control

Leonhard Menges

24 citations0/0 files storedThe Journal of Ethics

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Philosophical Ethics and Theory Law, Rights, and Freedoms Legal Rights and Human Rights

Abstract

Abstract Even though the idea that privacy is some kind of control is often presented as the standard view on privacy, there are powerful objections against it. The aim of this paper is to defend the control account of privacy against some particularly pressing challenges by proposing a new way to understand the relevant kind of control. The main thesis is that privacy should be analyzed in terms of source control, a notion that is adopted from discussions about moral responsibility.

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References

2009Privacy in Context 1996Two Faces of Responsibility 1994The impossibility of moral responsibility 1975Free Agency 1975Why privacy is important 1983Privacy, morality, and the law 1984The right to privacy 2004The value of privacy

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2022Inferences and the Right to Privacy 2021How We Can Make Sense of Control-Based Intuitions for Limited Access Conceptions of the Right to Privacy

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