SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
Bayesian Games: Games with Incomplete Information
16 references·0 citing·36 second hop
Bayesian Games: Games with Incomplete Information (2009)Bayesian Games: Games with Incomplete Inf…Repeated Games with Incomplete Information (2011)Repeated Games with Incomplet…Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model (2004)Games with Incomplete Informa…Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions (2000)Equilibrium in Sealed High Bi…Asymmetric Auctions (2000)Asymmetric AuctionsTopics in Microeconomics (1999)Topics in MicroeconomicsInteractive epistemology I: Knowledge (1999)Interactive epistemology I: K…Repeated games with incomplete information (1995)Repeated games with incomplet…Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge (1993)Hierarchies of Beliefs and Co…Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality (1987)Correlated Equilibrium as an …Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information (1985)Formulation of Bayesian analy…Information, trade and common knowledge (1982)Information, trade and common…A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)A Theory of Auctions and Comp…Agreeing to Disagree (1976)Agreeing to DisagreeSubjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies (1974)Subjectivity and correlation …Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game (1968)Games with Incomplete Informa…Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model (1967)Games with Incomplete Informa…COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Optimal Auction Design (1981)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Field Experiments (2004)Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points (1968)Robust Mechanism Design (2005)Dynamic psychological games (2008)Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium (2016)The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity (1978)Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders (1985)Herd Behavior and Investment (1988)Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets (1990)Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1975)The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling (1986)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)Non-Cooperative Games (1951)Non-cooperative games (1989)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action Presidential Address, American political Science Association, 1997 (2010)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1945)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities (1990)Foundations of Social Evolution (1998)A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium (2000)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)Job Market Signaling (1973)The Grammar of Society (2005)An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining (1982)Rationalist explanations for war (1995)Natural Justice (2005)Sixteen common misconceptions about the evolution of cooperation in humans (2010)Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design (2019)Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence (1982)Putting Auction Theory to Work (2004)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1982A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding3,770 cited
  • 1976Agreeing to Disagree2,499 cited
  • 1967Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model2,152 cited
  • 2004Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model2,127 cited
  • 1982Information, trade and common knowledge1,738 cited
  • 1974Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies1,630 cited
  • 1987Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality1,613 cited
  • 1968Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game1,059 cited
  • 1985Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information774 cited
  • 1995Repeated games with incomplete information536 cited
  • 2000Asymmetric Auctions510 cited
  • 2011Repeated Games with Incomplete Information487 cited
  • 2000Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions449 cited
  • 1993Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge443 cited
  • 1999Interactive epistemology I: Knowledge361 cited
  • 1999

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

Topics in Microeconomics
215 cited

Cited by

No citing works inside the corpus for this window.