Contractual Commitments, Bargaining Power, and Governance Inseparability: Incorporating History into Transaction Cost Theory

Nicholas Argyres · Julia Porter Liebeskind

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Nicholas S. Argyres, Julia Porter Liebeskind, Contractual Commitments, Bargaining Power, and Governance Inseparability: Incorporating History into Transaction Cost Theory, The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Jan., 1999), pp. 49-63

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