Japanese Corporate Groupings (Keiretsu) and the Informativeness of Earnings

Abstract

This paper examines the effect of Japanese corporate groupings, keiretsu, on the informativeness of earnings. Keiretsu firms maintain close financial and personal ties through cross‐shareholding, credit holding, interlocking corporate directorates, and various business transactions. We propose that the strong interrelations of the keiretsu ownership structure enhance the informativeness of earnings through efficient monitoring of managerial performance. Our empirical results show that keiretsu firms have higher earnings response coefficients than those of non‐keiretsu firms, the earnings response coefficient increases as the strength of the keiretsu relationship increases, and discretionary accruals by keiretsu firms are smaller than discretionary accruals of non‐keiretsu firms. All of these results suggest that the monitoring ability of the keiretsu improves the informativeness of earnings.

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