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Incentive Compensation when Executives can Hedge the Market: Evidence of Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section
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Incentive Compensation when Executives can Hedge the Market: Evidence of Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section (2004)Incentive Compensation when Executives ca…The Choice of Peers for Relative Performance Evaluation in Executive Compensation (2016)The Choice of Peers for Relat…Equity‐based incentives and collaboration in the modern multibusiness firm (2015)Equity‐based incentives and c…Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1987)The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (1995)Greatness Takes Practice: On Practice Theory’s Relevance to “Great Strategy” (2017)How do board ties affect the adoption of new practices? The effects of managerial interest and hierarchical power (2019)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts (1981)Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)
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  • 2015Equity‐based incentives and collaboration in the modern multibusiness firm27 cited
  • 2016The Choice of Peers for Relative Performance Evaluation in Executive Compensation22 cited

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