References

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• 1989Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations* *I have greatly benefited from comments received at Johns Hopkins University, Georgetown University, the Macro Lunch Group of the University of Pennsylvania, MIT, and the Research Department of the International Monetary Fund. I am particularly indebted to Matt Canzoneri, Sara Guerschanik-Calvo, Joseph Harrington, Jr, Elhanan Helpman, Nissan Leviatan, Maury Obstfeld, Assaf Razin, Sweder van Wijnbergen and two anonymous referees. The research on this paper was partly done while I was a visiting scholar at the Research Department of the Internationed Monetary Fund, and it was partially funded by the National Science Foundation. However, any opinions expressed are entirely my own and not those of any of the above institutions. This paper has already been published in the The American Economic Review, 78, 4, September 1988, pp. 647–661.450 cited
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• 2004The case for GDP-indexed bonds234 cited
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• 1999Safeguarding Prosperity in a Global Financial System: The Future International Financial Architecture