Managers Segment Financial Reporting Choice: An Analysis Of Firms Segment Reconciliations

Abstract

Under SFAS No. 131, a company is required to provide a reconciliation of the total of the reportable segments profit or loss to the firms consolidated income. This paper investigates these segment disclosures and related determinants of managers segment financial reporting choices. We focus on managers decisions to report segment-to-firm level reconciliations (i.e., segment reconciliations (SERs)) differences between firm-level and aggregated segment-level earnings. On average, we find that SERs are significant when the differences are not equal to zero. Firms with higher agency costs and greater accruals are less likely to report segment reconciliations. However, firms that have a greater number of segments, larger firms, and firms with higher leverage, losses, and greater earnings volatility are more likely to report SER?0. Consistent with managers having some segment reporting discretion, our overall findings suggest a managers segment reporting choice is partly driven by agency costs. Interestingly, among firms with reported segment reconciliations, firms with higher agency costs are more likely to report positive SERs. Consequently, this study documents a relation between proxies for agency costs and managers decisions to report segment reconciliations. Policy implications and suggestions for future research are discussed in the paper.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 28 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.