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Repeated moral hazard with effort persistence
16 references·0 citing·35 second hop
Repeated moral hazard with effort persistence (2010)Repeated moral hazard with effort persist…Efficient Allocations in Dynamic Private Information Economies with Persistent Shocks: A First-Order Approach (2013)Efficient Allocations in Dyna…Efficient allocations with moral hazard and hidden borrowing and lending: A recursive formulation (2008)Efficient allocations with mo…Capital Taxation and Ownership When Markets Are Incomplete (2007)Capital Taxation and Ownershi…Incentives, wages, and promotions: theory and evidence (2006)Incentives, wages, and promot…Repeated moral hazard with persistence (2004)Repeated moral hazard with pe…Figuring out the impact of hidden savings on optimal unemployment insurance (2004)Figuring out the impact of hi…A Recursive Formulation for Repeated Agency with History Dependence (2000)A Recursive Formulation for R…Repeated Moral Hazard and One-Sided Commitment (1995)Repeated Moral Hazard and One…Efficiency and Equality in a Simple Model of Efficient Unemployment Insurance (1995)Efficiency and Equality in a …International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation (1991)International Lending with Mo…Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima (1991)Computing Multi-Period, Infor…Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem (1990)Income fluctuation and asymme…Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems (1988)Justifying the First-Order Ap…On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting (1987)On Repeated Moral Hazard with…The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems (1985)The First-Order Approach to P…Repeated Moral Hazard (1985)Repeated Moral HazardMoral Hazard and Observability (1979)Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring (1986)Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment (1996)Optimal Unemployment Insurance (1997)Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics (2004)Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics (1989)On Efficient Distribution with Private Information (1992)Money and Dynamic Credit Arrangements with Private Information (2000)Aggregate Consequences of Limited Contract Enforceability (2005)Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device (1986)Salaries and Piece Rates (1986)Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships (1990)Optimal Indirect and Capital Taxation (2003)Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring (1990)Zero Expected Wealth Taxes: A Mirrlees Approach to Dynamic Optimal Taxation (2005)Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Private Information (2006)Insurance and Taxation over the Life Cycle (2013)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1992)Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard (1996)Monotone Comparative Statics under Uncertainty (2002)Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer (2016)The Adjustment of Consumption to Changing Expectations About Future Income (1981)Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts (1988)Communication, commitment, and growth (1992)An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1983)The Intertemporal Approach to the Current Account (1994)Default Risk and Income Fluctuations in Emerging Economies (2008)Efficient Allocations with Hidden Income and Hidden Storage (2001)Distinguishing Limited Liability from Moral Hazard in a Model of Entrepreneurship (2006)Optimal Mortgage Design (2010)Unemployment insurance with moral hazard in a dynamic economy (1996)Investment and liquidation in renegotiation-proof contracts with moral hazard (2004)Competitive risk sharing contracts with one-sided commitment (2006)The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures (1999)
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References

  • 1985The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems870 cited
  • 1987On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting641 cited
  • 1985Repeated Moral Hazard614 cited
  • 1988Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems511 cited
  • 1990Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem363 cited
  • 1991International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation360 cited
  • 1991Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima268 cited
  • 2000A Recursive Formulation for Repeated Agency with History Dependence247 cited
  • 1995Efficiency and Equality in a Simple Model of Efficient Unemployment Insurance157 cited
  • 1995Repeated Moral Hazard and One-Sided Commitment138 cited
  • 2004Figuring out the impact of hidden savings on optimal unemployment insurance118 cited
  • 2013Efficient Allocations in Dynamic Private Information Economies with Persistent Shocks: A First-Order Approach109 cited
  • 2008Efficient allocations with moral hazard and hidden borrowing and lending: A recursive formulation67 cited
  • 2007Capital Taxation and Ownership When Markets Are Incomplete61 cited
  • 2006Incentives, wages, and promotions: theory and evidence

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58 cited
  • 2004Repeated moral hazard with persistence29 cited
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