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Robust Mechanism Design
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Robust Mechanism Design (2005)Robust Mechanism DesignFormulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information (1985)Formulation of Bayesian analy…Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model (1967)Games with Incomplete Informa…Demand Analysis Using Strategic Reports: An Application to a School Choice Mechanism (2018)Demand Analysis Using Strateg…Robustness and Linear Contracts (2015)Robustness and Linear Contrac…An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (2015)An Introduction to the Theory…Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information (2013)Robust Predictions in Games W…On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation (2013)On the Equivalence of Bayesia…The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard (2012)The Multi-unit Assignment Pro…Revenue maximization with a single sample (2010)Revenue maximization with a s…Evolution and Intelligent Design (2008)Evolution and Intelligent Des…Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations (2007)Revisiting games of incomplet…Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords (2007)Internet Advertising and the …Interim Correlated Rationalizability (2007)Interim Correlated Rationaliz…Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms (2007)Foundations of Dominant-Strat…The Limits of ex post Implementation (2006)The Limits of ex post Impleme…Optimal Auctions with Ambiguity (2006)Optimal Auctions with Ambigui…Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords (2006)Internet Advertising and the …Optimal Pricing Mechanisms with Unknown Demand (2003)Optimal Pricing Mechanisms wi…COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)Multipart pricing of public goods (1971)Incentives in Teams (1973)Strategic bidder behavior in sponsored search auctions (2006)Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords (2006)Optimal real-time bidding for display advertising (2014)Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points (1968)Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model (2004)Dynamic psychological games (2008)Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium (2016)Information Design: A Unified Perspective (2019)Rational choice and the structure of the environment. (1956)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (1987)Calibrated Incentive Contracts (2013)How Do Classifiers Induce Agents to Invest Effort Strategically? (2019)Credible Auctions: A Trilemma (2020)College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)Teachers, Schools, and Academic Achievement (2005)Matching With (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy (2013)Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications (2015)Expanding “Choice” in School Choice (2015)Incentives and incomplete information (1979)Optimal Auction Design (1981)Infinite Dimensional Analysis (1999)Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality (1987)Social Value of Public Information (2002)The Network Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations (2012)Beeps (2016)Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium (2016)Information Sale and Competition (2019)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)Consumer Privacy and the Market for Customer Information (2004)Competitive auctions (2006)Exploring the economic value of open government data (2016)Monopoly and product quality (1978)Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory (2016)Robustness in Mechanism Design and Contracting (2019)Open Innovation Engineering—Preliminary Study on New Entrance of Technology to Market (2020)Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations (2005)Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords (2005)An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining (1982)Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence (1982)Putting Auction Theory to Work (2004)
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References

  • 1967Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model2,152 cited
  • 1985Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information774 cited

Cited by

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  • 2015Robustness and Linear Contracts330 cited
  • 2012The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard258 cited
  • 2013Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information206 cited
  • 2007Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms196 cited
  • 2003Optimal Pricing Mechanisms with Unknown Demand192 cited
  • 2006The Limits of ex post Implementation185 cited
  • 2018Demand Analysis Using Strategic Reports: An Application to a School Choice Mechanism170 cited
  • 2007Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations168 cited
  • 2007Interim Correlated Rationalizability167 cited
  • 2008Evolution and Intelligent Design152 cited
  • 2013On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation

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143 cited
  • 2010Revenue maximization with a single sample143 cited
  • 2006Optimal Auctions with Ambiguity131 cited
  • 2007Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords126 cited