Large Robust Games

2004-10-08articleEconometrica191 citationsclosed

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Game Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Abstract

With many semi-anonymous players, the equilibria of simultaneous-move games are extensively robust. This means that the equilibria survive even if the simultaneous-play assumption is relaxed to allow for a large variety of extensive modifications. Such modifications include sequential play with partial and differential revelation of information, commitments, multiple revisions of choices, cheap talk announcements, and more.

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