Agreeable trade with pessimism and optimism

Jean-Philippe Lefort · Adam Dominiak · Jürgen Eichberger

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Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics Game Theory and Applications Economic theories and models

Abstract

In this paper we extend the results on ex-ante agreeable trade of Kajii and Ui [Kajii, A., Ui, T., 2006. Agreeable bets with multiple priors. Journal of Economic Theory 128, 299–305] to the case of non-convex Choquet preferences. We discuss the economic relevance of the main result for the existence of speculative trade under ambiguity. Following Haller [Haller, H., 1990. Non-market reopening, time-consistent plans and the structure of intertemporal preferences. Economics Letters 32, 1–5] we also elaborate the relevance of updating preferences upon arrival of public information for the potential of re-contracting initial contingent claims.

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