III—Discrimination: The Good, the Bad, and the Wrongful

Abstract

This paper advances a view of what discrimination is, one emphasizing the reasons of the discriminator. It advances that view by explaining how discrimination could be objectionable when so understood. Sometimes discrimination is objectionable because it subjects a person to a disadvantage for no valid reason. However, this is not the only case of objectionable discrimination. Sometimes one should not subject someone to a disadvantage even for a valid reason. That reason is excluded from consideration. The paper outlines a view according to which the reasons that are to be excluded from consideration, under the heading of discrimination, are up for social and legal choice. Wrongful discrimination, on this view, is normally not a malum in se but a malum prohibitum.

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