SENSITIVITY, SAFETY, AND THE LAW: A REPLY TO PARDO

David Enoch · Levi Spectre

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Legal processes and jurisprudence Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies

Abstract

ABSTRACT In a recent paper, Michael Pardo argues that the epistemic property that is legally relevant is the one called Safety, rather than Sensitivity. In the process, he argues against our Sensitivity-related account of statistical evidence. Here we revisit these issues, partly in order to respond to Pardo, and partly in order to make general claims about legal epistemology. We clarify our account, we show how it adequately deals with counterexamples and other worries, we raise suspicions about Safety's value here, and we revisit our general skepticism about the role that epistemological considerations should play in determining legal policy.

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1996Elusive knowledge 1995Solving the Skeptical Problem 1999How to Defeat Opposition to Moore 1971Conclusive reasons 2012Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge 1998Contextualist solutions to epistemological problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the lottery 2009Replies to Critics 2017When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction?

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