Preference heterogeneity in monetary policy committees

Abstract

This short paper employs individual voting records of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England to study heterogeneity in policy preferences among committee members. The analysis is carried out using a simple general-ization of the standard New Keynesian framework that allows members to differ in the weight they give to output compared with inflation stabilization and in their views regarding opti-mal inflation and natural output. Results indicate that, quali-tatively, MPC members are fairly homogeneous in their policy preferences, but there are systematic quantitative differences in their policy reaction functions that are related to the nature of their membership and career background.

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