Explaining Chief Executive Empowerment: EU Summitry and Domestic Institutional Change

Abstract

One of the most prominent trends in the organisation of European parliamentary democracies is the empowerment of chief executives. This article submits that an important reason contributing to this development is summit decision-making in the European Union, which requires states to confer additional authority, discretion and resources on chief executives. The effects are long-term shifts in the domestic institutional balance of power between the executive and the legislature, as well as within the executive branch. The explanatory power of this argument is tested through a case study of chief executive empowerment in Sweden, as well as comparative qualitative evidence from a broader set of European states. The findings carry implications for research on the presidentialisation of politics, the domestic implications of international cooperation, and the Europeanisation of EU member countries.

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