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The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
11 references·2 citing·37 second hop
The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects (2012)The difference indifference makes in stra…Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources (2017)Incentive compatible allocati…On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems (2005)On two competing mechanisms f…Coalitional Strategy-Proof House Allocation (2002)Coalitional Strategy-Proof Ho…Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange (2000)Strategyproof Assignment by H…Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores (1999)Strategy-proofness and Essent…House Allocation with Existing Tenants (1999)House Allocation with Existin…Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities (1994)Strategy-proofness and the st…Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods (1982)Incentive compatibility in a …The Efficient Allocation of Individuals to Positions (1979)The Efficient Allocation of I…Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods (1977)Weak versus strong domination…On cores and indivisibility (1974)On cores and indivisibilityTwo-sided matching with indifferences (2017)Two-sided matching with indif…Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: The Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms (2010)Exchange of indivisible goods…On Cores and Indivisibility (1973)Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources (2011)Matching Markets: Theory and Practice (2013)College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)School choice: an experimental study (2005)Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions (2007)What Have We Learned from Market Design? (2008)Theory of Value (1959)Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences (2012)Games and Decisions (2015)College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)Constrained school choice (2009)Effective affirmative action in school choice (2013)School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach (2003)The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach (2013)Improving matching under hard distributional constraints (2017)What Really Matters in Designing School Choice Mechanisms (2017)Two-Sided Matching (1990)Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems (1998)Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities (2002)What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice (2008)The assignment game I: The core (1971)A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem (2001)Pairwise kidney exchange (2005)The Boston Public School Match (2005)Foundations of Economic Analysis. (1948)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)Ordinal Efficiency, Fairness, and Incentives in Large Markets (2011)A theory of school-choice lotteries (2015)Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching (1984)Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods (1999)The Mechanism Design Approach to Student Assignment (2011)Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation (2012)Incentive Compatibility of Large Centralized Matching Markets (2016)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1974On cores and indivisibility1,254 cited
  • 1979The Efficient Allocation of Individuals to Positions553 cited
  • 1999House Allocation with Existing Tenants450 cited
  • 1977Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods378 cited
  • 2000Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange353 cited
  • 1982Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods279 cited
  • 1994Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities272 cited
  • 1999Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores171 cited
  • 2005On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems157 cited
  • 2017Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources132 cited
  • 2002Coalitional Strategy-Proof House Allocation97 cited

Cited by

  • 2010Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: The Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms76 cited
  • 2017Two-sided matching with indifferences75 cited

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