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Repeat patent plaintiffs - those who sue eight or more times on the samepatents - have a disproportionate effect on the patent system. They areresponsible for a sizeable fraction of all patent lawsuits. Their patentsshould be among the strongest, according to all economic measures of patentquality. And logic suggests that repeat patent plaintiffs should be riskaverse, settling more of their cases and taking only the very best to trialto avoid having their patents invalidated. In this paper, we test thosehypotheses. We find that repeat patent plaintiffs are somewhat more likelyto settle their cases. But, to our surprise, we find that when they do goto trial or judgment, overwhelmingly they lose. This result seems to bedriven by two parallel findings: both software patents and patents owned bynon-practicing entities (so-called "patent trolls") fare extremely poorlyin court. We offer some possible explanations for why a group of apparentlyweak patents nonetheless have so much influence over the patent system, andsome preliminary thoughts about how these findings should shape the patentreform debate.
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Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.
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