Articlegreen2011

Collective Dynamic Choice: The Necessity of Time Inconsistency

202 citations0/0 files storedAmerican Economic Journal Microeconomics

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Game Theory and Voting Systems Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics Economic theories and models

Abstract

We study collective decisions by time-discounting individuals choosing a common consumption stream. We show that with any heterogeneity in time preferences, every Pareto efficient and non-dictatorial method of aggregating utility functions must be time-inconsistent. We also show that decisions made via non-dictatorial voting methods are intransitive.

Citations in this library

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References

2019American Economic Review 1977Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans 1951Social Choice and Individual Values.2002Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review 1997Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting 2006Incentives and Prosocial Behavior 1999Doing It Now or Later 1955Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization

Cited by

2013Charitable Giving 2014Fiscal Rules and Discretion Under Persistent Shocks 2016Competitiveness and industrial policy: from rationalities of failure towards the ability to evolve 2015Government Policy with Time Inconsistent Voters 2017Consistent climate policies 2017INTRA‐HOUSEHOLD EXPERIMENTS: A SURVEY 2015Discounting Disentangled 2020Impulsive Consumption and Financial Well-Being: Evidence from an Increase in the Availability of Alcohol

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