The Rise of NGO Activism

Julien Daubanes · Jean-Charles mname Rochet

36 citations0/0 files storedAmerican Economic Journal Economic Policy

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Regulation and Compliance Studies Merger and Competition Analysis Political Influence and Corporate Strategies

Abstract

Activist nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) increasingly oppose firms’ practices. We suggest this might be related to the vulnerability of public regulation to corporate influence. We examine a potentially harmful industrial project subject to regulatory approval. Under industry influence, the regulator may approve the project even though it is harmful. However, an NGO may oppose it. We characterize the circumstances under which NGO opposition occurs and under which it is socially beneficial. Our theory explains the role that NGOs have assumed in the last decades, and has implications for the social legitimacy of activism and the appropriate degree of transparency of industrial activities. (JEL D21, D74, D82, L31, L51)

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 36 citations exist upstream.

References

1960The Problem of Social Cost 1971The Theory of Economic Regulation 2000The Regulation of Entry 2006Incentives and Prosocial Behavior 2010Review of Economic Studies 2005Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents 2001Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Integrated Strategy 1986Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.