If You’re Against Them You’re With Us

Abstract

This article advances a theory of why some dictators weaken the elite through expropriation whereas others do not. When the organization that launches a new dictator into power is uncertain about whether he will remain loyal to them, a dictator’s decision to expropriate the preexisting elite may contribute to political stability by signaling his exclusive reliance on this group. The authors corroborate this claim empirically. Using new data compiled on land, resource, and bank expropriations in Latin America from 1950 to 2002, the authors show that large-scale expropriation helps dictators survive in power. Furthermore, expropriation tends to occur early in a dictator’s tenure, and its effect on leader survival decays over time, providing additional evidence for its signaling value. The history of autocracy in Mexico between 1911 and 2000 further illustrates the importance of expropriation in promoting autocratic survival as well as how the codification of new property rights can transform a dictator’s launching organization into a new economic elite.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 118 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.