References

• 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
• 1996The Use of Knowledge in Society6,434 cited
• 1985The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences6,243 cited
• 1991Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design6,042 cited
• 1982Moral Hazard in Teams4,992 cited
• 1999Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance4,334 cited
• 1992The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies3,591 cited
• 1999The Provision of Incentives in Firms3,337 cited
• 1989Handbook of Labor Economics3,153 cited
• 1997Formal and Real Authority in Organizations3,119 cited
• 1987Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives2,870 cited
• 2002Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralized versus Hierarchical Firms2,426 cited
• 2008Executive compensation2,390 cited
• 2001Financial accounting information and corporate governance2,296 cited
• 2001Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function2,289 cited
• 2001