Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value

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146 citations0/0 files storedEconometrica

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Game Theory and Voting Systems Game Theory and Applications Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Abstract

Our concern is the extension of the theory of the Shapley value to problems involving externalities. Using the standard axiom systems behind the Shapley value leads to the identification of bounds on players' payoffs around an “externality-free” value. The approach determines the direction and maximum size of Pigouvian-like transfers among players, transfers based on the specific nature of externalities that are compatible with basic normative principles. Examples are provided to illustrate the approach and to draw comparisons with previous literature.

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References

195317. A Value for n-Person Games 1988A value for n -person games 1985Monotonic solutions of cooperative games 1974Cooperative games with coalition structures 2002The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures 1989Potential, Value, and Consistency 1983Endogenous Formation of Coalitions 1980Conference structures and fair allocation rules

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2006Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities 2007Sharing a river among satiable agents 2007Efficiency in coalition games with externalities 2014Coalition Formation

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