The Simple Economics of Optimal PersuasionPiotr Dworczak, Giorgio Martini2017-01-01articleJournal of Political Economy215 citationsgreenNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.Game Theory and ApplicationsDecision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsAuction Theory and ApplicationsAbstractNo abstract was published for this record.Citations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 215 citations exist upstream.References1982Strategic Information Transmission2011Bayesian Persuasion1999Walrasian Equilibrium with Gross Substitutes2010Optimal Information Disclosure2003Optimization with Stochastic Dominance Constraints2005On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting2017Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver2011Competition in PersuasionCited by2020Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications2017Benchmarks in Search Markets2020Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives2024Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms2020Optimal Quality Certification2022Persuasion via Weak Institutions2018An Explicit Representation for Disappointment Aversion and Other Betweenness Preferences