Multiproduct Cournot oligopoly

Justin P. Johnson · David P. Myatt

81 citations0/0 files storedThe RAND Journal of Economics

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Merger and Competition Analysis Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing Digital Platforms and Economics

Abstract

We study a Cournot industry in which each firm sells multiple quality-differentiated products. We use an upgrades approach, working not with the actual products but instead with upgrades from one quality to the next. The properties of single-product models carry over to the supply of upgrades, but not necessarily to the supply of complete products. Product line determinants and welfare results are presented. Strategic commitment to product lines is considered; firms may well choose to compete head-to-head.

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References

1975MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION AND OPTIMUM PRODUCT DIVERSITY 1973A Theory of Marriage: Part I 1978Monopoly and product quality 1982Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation 1934The Economics of Imperfect Competition.1986Free Entry and Social Inefficiency 1984Monopoly with Incomplete Information 1979Price competition, quality and income disparities

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