Giving the People What They Want? The Distribution of Earmarks in the U.S. House of Representatives

Abstract

Common wisdom holds that members of Congress distribute earmarks on a purely political basis. Likewise, Congressional scholars hold that political factors are preeminent in determining where earmarks go, even more than for other types of pork barrel spending. Using earmarks appearing in the fiscal 2008 Appropriations bills, I test for both political and demand-side determinants of the distribution of earmarks. I find that both types of factors are significantly related to the number of earmarks which a House member receives. This result leads us to reject the common wisdom account that local demand plays no role in the distribution of earmarks, and calls into question whether earmarks should be treated as an outlier within the universe of spending allocation mechanisms.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 72 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.