Architecture as Crime Control

Abstract

Building on work in architectural theory, this Article demonstrates how additional attention to cities, neighborhoods, and individual buildings can reduce criminal activity. The field of cyberlaw has been transformed by the insight that architecture can regulate behavior in cyberspace; this insight will now be applied to the regulation of behavior in real space. The instinct of many lawyers, however, is to focus on legal rules, without thinking about the constraint of physical space. Ironically, even an architectural problem in crime control - "broken windows" - has prompted legal, not architectural solutions. Four architectural concepts are considered: increasing an area's natural surveillance (its visibility and susceptibility to monitoring by private citizens); introducing territoriality (by demarcating private and semiprivate spaces); reducing social isolation; and protecting potential targets. Some of these mechanisms are subtle, often times invisible, methods that prevent criminal activity. The Article then illustrates specific legal mechanisms that harness the power of architecture to prevent crime. Distinguishing between situations where the government acts as a builder, civil regulator, and criminal enforcer, solutions are suggested in a variety of legal fields, drawing on property, torts, taxation, contracts, and criminal law. Procurement and taxation strategies can promote effective public architecture; crime impact statements, zoning, tort suits, and contractual regulation may engender private architectural solutions as well. Criminal law, particularly through forfeiture, may also play a role. Several problems with architectural regulation are considered, such as the extension of social control and potential losses in privacy. Nevertheless, the Article concludes by suggesting that local jurisdictions should emphasize architecture more, and standard law-enforcement methods less.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 117 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.