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Eminent Domain versus Government Purchase of Land Given Imperfect Information about Owners’ Valuations
6 references·8 citing·37 second hop
Eminent Domain versus Government Purchase of Land Given Imperfect Information about Owners’ Valuations (2010)Eminent Domain versus Government Purchase…A Bargaining Model of Holdouts and Takings (2007)A Bargaining Model of Holdout…An Economic Analysis of Takings (1995)An Economic Analysis of Takin…Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents (1990)Asymmetric Information Bargai…The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation be Paid? (1984)The Taking of Land: When Shou…An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain (1976)An Economic Analysis of Emine…Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral (1972)Property Rules, Liability Rul…Takings of Land by Self-Interested Governments: Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain (2018)Takings of Land by Self-Inter…Who's holding out? An experimental study of the benefits and burdens of eminent domain (2017)Who's holding out? An experim…Compulsory Land Acquisition in Developing Countries: Shifting Paradigm or Entrenched Legacy? (2017)Compulsory Land Acquisition i…Dealing with eminent domain (2014)Dealing with eminent domainThe use of eminent domain in land assembly: The case of the Tennessee Valley Authority (2013)The use of eminent domain in …The economic theory of eminent domain: private property, public use (2012)The economic theory of eminen…Tax Motivated Takings (2008)Tax Motivated TakingsThe Economics of Eminent Domain: Private Property, Public Use, and Just Compensation (2007)The Economics of Eminent Doma…A constitutional choice model of compensation for takings (1989)When the Truth Hurts: Endangered Species Policy on Private Land with Imperfect Information (1998)The taking of land: market value compensation should be paid (2001)Police Powers, Regulatory Takings and the Efficient Compensation of Domestic and Foreign Investors* (2009)Foundations of Economic Analysis. (1948)Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (2004)An Experimental Study of the Holdout Problem in a Multilateral Bargaining Game (2009)Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information (1984)The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets (1998)Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons (2000)Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research (1998)Detecting Failures of Backward Induction: Monitoring Information Search in Sequential Bargaining (2002)z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments (2007)Optimal Auction Design (1981)Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions (1988)Does voluntary participation undermine the Coase Theorem? (2000)Incentives and Political Economy (2001)Inequality, Control Rights, and Rent Seeking: Sugar Cooperatives in Maharashtra (2001)The Problem of Social Cost (1960)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Geographical Knowledges and Neoliberal Tensions: Compulsory Land Purchase in the Context of Contemporary Urban Redevelopment (2010)Expropriation, valuation and compensation practice in Ethiopia (2013)The Coase Theorem at Sixty (2020)The Nature of the Firm (1937)A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures (1956)The Use of Eminent Domain for Economic Development in the Era of Kelo (2013)Eminent Domain in the United States (2017)Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract (1984)Takings, Compensation and Endangered Species Protection on Private Lands (1998)The Political Economy of the Investment Treaty Regime (2017)The Structure of Urban Land Prices (1997)The holdout problem, urban sprawl, and eminent domain (2007)Creative Destruction: Barriers to Urban Growth and the Great Boston Fire of 1872 (2017)International organization: a state of the art on an art of the state (1986)The Architecture of Government (2007)Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale (2010)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1972Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral1,912 cited
  • 1990Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents412 cited
  • 1984The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation be Paid?246 cited
  • 1976An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain145 cited
  • 2007A Bargaining Model of Holdouts and Takings78 cited
  • 1995An Economic Analysis of Takings73 cited

Cited by

  • 2012The economic theory of eminent domain: private property, public use37 cited
  • 2007The Economics of Eminent Domain: Private Property, Public Use, and Just Compensation30 cited
  • 2014Dealing with eminent domain27 cited
  • 2013The use of eminent domain in land assembly: The case of the Tennessee Valley Authority19 cited
  • 2008Tax Motivated Takings17 cited
  • 2017Compulsory Land Acquisition in Developing Countries: Shifting Paradigm or Entrenched Legacy?15 cited
  • 2018Takings of Land by Self-Interested Governments: Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain14 cited
  • 2017Who's holding out? An experimental study of the benefits and burdens of eminent domain12 cited

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