Innovation Variety and Patent Breadth

Hugo A. Hopenhayn · Matthew F. Mitchell

110 citations0/0 files storedThe RAND Journal of Economics

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Intellectual Property and Patents Intellectual Property Law Merger and Competition Analysis

Abstract

When innovations are heterogeneous, it may be advantageous to provide a variety of patents. By trading off patent breadth for length, it is possible that fees are not needed in the optimal policy. We present two examples. The first is a quality-ladder model, in which innovations benefit society directly as well as through their use as building blocks to future inventions, and the rate of arrival for the future innovation is unobserved. More fertile innovations get more breadth for a shorter time. Menus may also be useful in the case of horizontal product differentiation.

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1990How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?1992Patent Policy and Costly Imitation

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2005Models of knowledge and systems of governance 2020The Coase Theorem at Sixty 2012Market Power Screens Willingness-to-Pay*2017The direction of innovation 2010Property Rights and Invention 2013Patent quality and incentives at the patent office 2021On the Direction of Innovation 2019Sequential innovation, patent policy, and the dynamics of the replacement effect

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