Pricing decision and coordination mechanism of dual-channel supply chain dominated by a risk-aversion retailer under demand disruption

Abstract

This paper studies a dual-channel supply chain composed of a retailer and a supplier, and discusses the optimal decisions of supply chain participants under decentralized decision-making without and with demand disruption, respectively. By comparing the optimal decisions in the two scenarios, we find that the optimal decision after demand disruption is a linear function of the demand disruption plus optimal decision before demand disruption. Additionally, when the demand disruption is in interval (−ψu2, ψu1), the optimal total production of the supply chain is equal before and after demand disruption. Moreover, the profits of the supply chain members and the value of their recognizing demand disruption are largely affected by the scale of demand disruption. Finally, the results show that the improved revenue-sharing contract can effectively improve the supply chain performance.

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