Public psychology and the Cold War brainwashing scare

Abstract

In 1950, a new word 'brainwashing' entered the English language. Though its meaning was always ambiguous and continuously evolving, it captured various concerns about the future uses of psychology in warfare and domestic life and the potential for new technologies to control and manipulate human minds. Recent scholarship on what historians have called the 'Cold War brainwashing scare' has tended to treat brainwashing as a Cold War paranoia or fantasy that not only was never to be, but was never really supported by scientific research. Drawing on recent scholarship and my own research, this paper examines some of the interactions between experts and popular discourses on brainwashing. For many experts, the Cold War brainwashing scare offered an opportunity to engage the public with contemporary psychological theory and research. But it was by no means a discussion over which they had complete control. It will be argued that the popular debate about brainwashing was not only a question of dealing with scientific 'facts', but existed in a more diverse imaginary concerned as much with present realities, as it was with future possibilities. Much in the same way that stories about artificial intelligence are reported today, discussions of techniques of brainwashing were often accompanied by speculation both wild and grounded about how new technology may be used in the future and by whom. This paper covers three examples: Korean War military psychiatrists, the popular theories of William Sargant and the field of experimental research known broadly as sensory deprivation. It concludes with some observations about current concerns about psychological manipulation in the digital age and the role psychology expertise plays in navigating these concerns.

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