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In a recent special issue dedicated to the work of Dani Rodrik, Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni [(2018). Modeling model selection in model pluralism. Journal of Economic Methodology, 25(3), 265–275. https://doi.org/10.1080/1350178X.2018.1488572] raise a potentially damning problem for Rodrik's suggestion that progress in economics should be understood and measured laterally, by a continuous expansion of new models. They argue that this could lead to an ‘embarrassment of riches’, i.e. the rapid expansion of our model library to such an extent that we become unable to choose between the available models, and thus needs to be solved to make ‘model pluralism’ viable. Drawing on Veit’s [(2019a). Model pluralism. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 50(2), 91–114. https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393119894897] ‘model pluralism’ account, this paper argues that model pluralism as a thesis about the relationship between science and nature undermines the very idea of a general model selection framework for policy making.
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