Low-Carbon Supply Chain Emission Reduction Strategy Considering the Supervision of Downstream Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Abstract

In order to explore the issue of multi-party collaborative governance of energy conservation and emission reduction under the perspective of the low-carbon supply chain, the participation of downstream enterprises as an effective source of local government supervision is included in the selection of low-carbon behaviors of suppliers. First, this paper establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model among local governments, suppliers and downstream enterprise groups. By calculating and copying dynamic equations, the asymptotic stability analysis of the three parties of the game is performed and the stability of the Jacobian matrix proposed by Friedman is used to analyze the local stability of the model equilibrium point and the evolutionary stability strategy of the system. Secondly, the evolution results and evolution paths of the model under different strategies are simulated by system dynamics and the influence of different parameters on the main body selection strategy of the tripartite game is analyzed. Finally, the paper puts forward corresponding policy suggestions from the perspectives of local government, suppliers and downstream enterprises in order to provide new ideas for the governance of China’s environmental problems from the perspective of low carbon.

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