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Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms
16 references·0 citing·29 second hop
Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms (2020)Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumula…Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory (2016)Matching with slot-specific p…Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications (2015)Efficient Matching under Dist…Matching with Contracts: Comment (2013)Matching with Contracts: Comm…Matching With (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy (2013)Matching With (Branch-of-Choi…Bidding for Army Career Specialties: Improving the ROTC Branching Mechanism (2013)Bidding for Army Career Speci…Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation (2012)Stability and Preference Alig…Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts (2010)Substitutes and stability for…Matching with Contracts (2005)Matching with ContractsStable schedule matching under revealed preference (2003)Stable schedule matching unde…A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications (2003)A Fixed-Point Approach to Sta…A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement (1999)A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Stu…Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems (1994)Top dominance and the possibi…Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching (1984)Stability and Polarization of…The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives (1982)The Economics of Matching: St…Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes (1982)Job Matching, Coalition Forma…College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)College Admissions and the St…College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)Two-Sided Matching (1990)School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds Versus Soft Bounds (2011)Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. (1992)School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach (2003)Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match (2009)Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences (2012)Putting Auction Theory to Work (2004)Strategyproof Matching with Minimum Quotas (2015)Marketplaces, Markets, and Market Design (2018)Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators and Antiviral Treatments: Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Health Care Rationing (2021)Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods (1977)Competitive Equilibrium in an Exchange Economy with Indivisibilities (1997)Stability in Supply Chain Networks (2008)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory (1984)Collective Choice and Social Welfare (1972)Biased perceptions of income distribution and preferences for redistribution: Evidence from a survey experiment (2012)Retracted: Growing up in a Recession (2013)American Economic Review (2019)Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords (2007)Cores of convex games (1971)The assignment game I: The core (1971)A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks (1996)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Contrasting Computational Models of Mate Preference Integration Across 45 Countries (2019)Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets* (2013)Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Trading Networks (2013)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1962College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage6,490 cited
  • 1982Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes1,307 cited
  • 1982The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives897 cited
  • 2005Matching with Contracts802 cited
  • 1999A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement567 cited
  • 1984Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching363 cited
  • 2003A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications291 cited
  • 2015Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications239 cited
  • 2010Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts215 cited
  • 2013Matching With (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy199 cited
  • 2016Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory164 cited
  • 2013Matching with Contracts: Comment161 cited
  • 1994Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems153 cited
  • 2003Stable schedule matching under revealed preference150 cited
  • 2012Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation147 cited
  • 2013

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Bidding for Army Career Specialties: Improving the ROTC Branching Mechanism
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