The dark side of the ‘Moral Machine’ and the fallacy of computational ethical decision-making for autonomous vehicles

Abstract

This paper reveals the dangers of the Moral Machine experiment, alerting against both its uses for normative ends, and the whole approach it is built upon to address ethical issues. It explores additional methodological limits of the experiment on top of those already identified by its authors and provides reasons why it is inadequate in supporting ethical and juridical discussions to determine the moral settings for autonomous vehicles. Demonstrating the inner fallacy behind computational social choice methods when applied to ethical decision-making, it also warns against the dangers of computational moral systems, such as the ‘voting-based system’ recently developed out of the Moral Machine’s data. Finally, it discusses the Moral Machine’s ambiguous impact on public opinion; on the one hand, laudable for having successfully raised global awareness with regard to ethical concerns about autonomous vehicles, and on the other hand pernicious, as it has led to a significant narrowing of the spectrum of autonomous vehicle ethics, de facto imposing a strong unidirectional approach, while brushing aside other major moral issues.

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