Bank acquisitions and ownership structure: Theory and evidence*

Linda Allen

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Corporate Finance and Governance Banking stability, regulation, efficiency Merger and Competition Analysis

Abstract

In this paper we both theoretically and empirically consider the joint nature of two owner-manager conflict resolution mechanisms: insider shareholdings, a, and shareholder concentration, 7. We Iind evidence of a signilicant entrenchment effect for high x, low y tirms. Moreover, bidder returns are found to be positive for high x. high 7 firms only. We utilize a switching of regression regimes model to solve for critical values of I and 7 that subdivide the universe of acquiring firms into separate and distinct ownership structure regimes, i.e., that deline ‘high ’ vs. ‘low ’ levels of z or y. 1.

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References

1986Large Shareholders and Corporate Control 1988Management ownership and market valuation 1983The market for corporate control 1986The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers 1981Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers 1988Managerial control of voting rights 1987Corporate Takeover Bids, Methods of Payment, and Bidding Firms' Stock Returns 1989The Employer Size-Wage Effect

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2014Corporate Governance in Banks and its Impact on Risk and Performance: Review of Literature on the Selected Governance Mechanisms

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