FinTech innovation regulation based on reputation theory with the participation of new media

Abstract

The information asymmetry caused by the virtual nature of the Internet is a challenge faced by FinTech innovation regulation, whereas new media participation makes the information environment more complex. From the perspective of finding a dynamic balance between innovation and regulation, this study considers reputation adjustment under new media participation, as well as the corresponding selection of an innovation path. It is found that the equilibrium strategy of an excessive innovative FinTech platform is directly related to its time preference. For platforms that pay more attention to the current interests, the high-pressure regulatory environment and public opinion supervision can effectively restrain excessive innovation, whereas for platforms that focus on long-term interests, appropriate relaxation of regulatory pressure and public opinion environment can encourage the platform to maintain its reputation by pretending to be compliant.

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