Faith Entails Belief: Three Avenues of Defense Against the Argument from Doubt

Abstract

Abstract Doxasticism is the view that propositional faith entails belief. A common criticism of doxasticism is that faith seems compatible with doubt in a way that belief is not. Thus, it seems possible to have faith without belief, and several non‐doxasticist accounts of faith are motivated inter alia by the need to account for this type of doubt. I provide three avenues of response: (1) favored cases of faith without belief beg the question by stipulating faith‐that‐p‐without‐belief‐that‐p, or if the non‐doxasticist provides evidence that there is faith without belief, this evidence points to either (2) no‐faith‐that‐p‐because‐disbelief‐that‐p or (3) faith‐that‐p‐with‐belief‐that‐p.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 20 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.