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Contracts under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
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Contracts under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection (2021)Contracts under Moral Hazard and Adverse …Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard (2022)Simple contracts with adverse…Simple versus Optimal Contracts (2019)Simple versus Optimal Contrac…Delegated Search Approximates Efficient Search (2018)Delegated Search Approximates…Adaptive Contract Design for Crowdsourcing Markets: Bandit Algorithms for Repeated Principal-Agent Problems (2016)Adaptive Contract Design for …Free-Riding and Free-Labor in Combinatorial Agency (2009)Free-Riding and Free-Labor in…Combinatorial agency (2006)Combinatorial agencyThe Theory of Incentives: The Principal‐Agent Model. (2003)The Theory of Incentives: The…The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)The Theory of Incentives: The…Foundations of Insurance Economics (1992)Foundations of Insurance Econ…An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1992)An Analysis of the Principal-…Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms (1986)Using Cost Observation to Reg…Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations (1991)Optimal Incentives for Teams (2001)Contribution Games in Networks (2011)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)Job Market Signaling (1973)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)The Economics of Governance (2005)A “Selection Model” of Political Representation* (2009)Introduction to Multi-Armed Bandits (2019)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1983)Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (1987)Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships (1991)The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture (1991)The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective (1999)Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract) (1999)Algorithms, games, and the internet (2001)Combinatorial agency (2012)Finite-time Analysis of the Multiarmed Bandit Problem (2002)Prediction, Learning, and Games (2006)A Perspective on Incentive Design: Challenges and Opportunities (2018)Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large (1964)Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection (1972)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)American Economic Review (2019)Disentangling Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection (2023)Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design (1991)Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation (2007)Opinion Paper: “So what if ChatGPT wrote it?” Multidisciplinary perspectives on opportunities, challenges and implications of generative conversational AI for research, practice and policy (2023)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 2001The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model2,056 cited
  • 1992An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem1,933 cited
  • 1986Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms1,215 cited
  • 2003The Theory of Incentives: The Principal‐Agent Model.634 cited
  • 2016Adaptive Contract Design for Crowdsourcing Markets: Bandit Algorithms for Repeated Principal-Agent Problems75 cited
  • 2006Combinatorial agency67 cited
  • 1992Foundations of Insurance Economics55 cited
  • 2019Simple versus Optimal Contracts51 cited
  • 2022Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard43 cited
  • 2009Free-Riding and Free-Labor in Combinatorial Agency36 cited
  • 2018Delegated Search Approximates Efficient Search28 cited

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