Do companies try to conceal financial misstatements through auditor shopping?

Abstract

Abstract Prior studies on auditor shopping primarily focused on the motivation to avoid unfavorable audit opinions, such as going concern and modified opinion. In this study, we show that companies that misstate their financial statements engage in auditor shopping to try to conceal the financial misstatements. In other words, their misstatements would have been discovered sooner had they made an opposite “replace or retain” auditor decision. We further show that engagement in auditor shopping results in a higher turnover of the CEO, the CFO and audit committee members but only when auditor shopping involves auditor dismissal. Thus, we document the negative consequences of engaging in auditor shopping. Finally, we show that effective monitoring curbs auditor shopping. Our findings should be of interest to regulators who continue to express concerns over this practice as well as to senior managers and audit committee members.

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