Studying the Complexity of Multichannel Supply Chain with Different Power Structures Under Carbon Subsidy Policy

Abstract

The game characteristics and equilibrium strategies of a triple-channel supply chain under the carbon subsidy policy are studied in this work with three different game power structures. There are simultaneous decision-making, manufacturer-dominated market and retailer-dominated market. The decision mechanism for order quantity of manufacturer and dual-channel retailer, is discussed. Meanwhile, their complex dynamic characteristics are studied. It is found that when the government implements dual low-carbon subsidies, the supply chain system in which the manufacturer dominates the market is more stable. The government should pay attention to the power structure of the market to determine an appropriate subsidy rate. The over-adjustment of order quantity from manufacturer’s direct sales channel and retailer’s online channel both will lead to large periodical fluctuations in the system, and even bifurcation and chaos. These will cause substantial fluctuations and even loss in the profits of supply chain companies. This analysis shows that delayed feedback can effectively stabilize the periodic bifurcation and chaos in the system.

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