The epistemology of modal modeling

Abstract

Abstract Philosophers of science have recently taken care to highlight different modeling practices where scientific models primarily contribute modal information, in the form of for example possibility claims, how‐possibly explanations, or counterfactual conditionals. While examples abound, comparatively little attention is being paid to the question of under what conditions , and in virtue of what, models can perform this epistemic function. In this paper, we firstly delineate modal modeling from other modeling practices, and secondly review attempts to spell out and explain the epistemic success conditions of modal modeling. The aim is to more clearly expose the respective justificatory strategies of these accounts, and secondly, to identify lacunae where further work is needed.

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