“Adding Up” Reasons: Lessons for Reductive and Nonreductive Approaches

Shyam Nair

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Philosophical Ethics and Theory Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge

Abstract

How do multiple reasons combine to support a conclusion about what to do or believe? This question raises two challenges: (1) How can we represent the strength of a reason? (2) How do the strengths of multiple reasons combine? Analogous challenges about confirmation have been answered using probabilistic tools. Can reductive and nonreductive theories of reasons use these tools to answer their challenges? Yes, or more exactly: reductive theories can answer both challenges. Nonreductive theories, with the help of a (new?) result in confirmation theory, can answer one, and there are grounds for optimism that they can answer the other.

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References

1999The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory 1991Foundations of Measurement:2007Slaves of the Passions 1998The Authority of Reason 1999The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity 2005How Probabilities Reflect Evidence 2014Confusion of Tongues 2016Fittingness First

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